Citation: 2025 CHRT 5

Date: January 27, 2025

File No. : HR-DP-3025-24

Between:

Ryan Richards

Complainant

- and -

Canadian Human Rights Commission

Commission

- and -

Correctional Service Canada

Respondent

Ruling

Member: Jennifer Khurana

I. OVERVIEW

[1] Ryan Richards, the Complainant, is a federally sentenced inmate who is currently incarcerated at Warkworth Institution. He alleges that Correctional Service Canada (CSC), the Respondent, retaliated against him because of other human rights complaints he filed against it, contrary to section 14.1 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 (the “Act”).

[2] Mr. Richards filed his Statement of Particulars (SOP) but did not say what remedies he was seeking, nor did he provide a list of documents that relate to his case or a list of witnesses with a summary of their intended evidence, as required by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, 2021, SOR/2021-137 (the “Rules”). The Tribunal directed Mr. Richards to do so, and he filed an amended SOP, witness list and will-say statements.

[3] This ruling determines two motions filed by CSC. First, CSC is asking the Tribunal to strike some of Mr. Richards’ allegations because they are outside the scope of the complaint the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) referred to the Tribunal or because it is plain and obvious that some of the allegations will fail. It has similar concerns with portions of the Commission’s SOP it claims have no factual nexus to Mr. Richards’ complaint. CSC also asks that the Tribunal strike parts of any intended witness evidence that would address allegations it says are outside the scope of the complaint.

[4] Second, CSC filed a motion asking the Tribunal to order Mr. Richards to provide more and better particulars of his allegations of discrimination and retaliation so that it can fairly defend against the allegations, several of which are vague and undefined. Should the requested allegations not be struck from the SOPs, CSC seeks particulars on allegations referenced in Mr. Richards’ will-say statements. It also wants the Tribunal to order Mr. Richards to detail the relief he is seeking under the Act. Finally, CSC is asking that the timelines for filing its SOP be extended by 45 days from the date of the requested particulars filed by Mr. Richards.

[5] Mr. Richards filed a response to CSC’s motions and disputes the claims that the SOP is outside the scope of his complaint or not detailed enough, though he added particulars of his allegations in his response.

[6] The Commission disagrees with CSC’s motions in their entirety, with the exception of the request that Mr. Richards set out the remedies he is seeking. It submits that the allegations of retaliation in the SOPs are clearly articulated, sufficiently particularized and directly tied to the original complaint and referral record.

II. DECISION

[7] I am allowing CSC’s requests to strike allegations in Mr. Richards’ SOP and corresponding paragraphs in the Commission’s SOP where they constitute distinct incidents that were not mentioned in the complaint and do not have a sufficient nexus connecting them to the key issues in dispute. I am dismissing other allegations where it is plain and obvious that they are bound to fail as claims of retaliation because they do not involve Mr. Richards. As Mr. Richards provided further particulars in his response to CSC’s motion, I make no order on the motion for further particulars except to direct Mr. Richards to detail his remedial request. CSC’s requests to strike portions of Mr. Richards’ witness statements or for further particulars of intended witness testimony are premature and are dismissed. Its request to extend the deadlines to file its SOP, disclosure and witness statements is also dismissed.

III. ISSUES

[8] This ruling determines three issues:

1) Should some of the allegations in Mr. Richards’ and the Commission’s SOPs be struck because they are outside the scope of the complaint or because it is plain and obvious they will fail?

2) Should portions of Mr. Richards’ witness statements also be struck?

3) Are further particulars required for CSC to be able to fairly prepare for the hearing and for the efficient conduct of these proceedings?

4) Should the Tribunal extend the timelines for the filing of CSC’s SOP, disclosure, witness lists and will-say statements?

IV. ANALYSIS

[9] The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited by the scope of the original complaint filed with the Commission and the Commission’s decision when referring the complaint to the Tribunal (Connors v. Canadian Armed Forces, 2019 CHRT 6 at paras 27–28). The Tribunal can amend, clarify and determine the scope of a complaint to determine the real questions in controversy between the parties, provided the amendment is linked to the original complaint and does not cause prejudice to the other parties (Canada (Attorney General) v. Parent, 2006 FC 1313 at paras 30, 40; Mohamed v Royal Bank of Canada, 2023 CHRT 20 at para 7).

[10] Complaints are open to refinement, but the complaint must reflect the substance of the original complaint (Gaucher v. Canada (Armed Forces) 2005 CHRT 1 in Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation v. Public Service Alliance of Canada (Local 70396), 2006 FC 704 at para 52). Amendments cannot introduce a substantially new complaint as this would bypass the referral process set out in the Act (Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies v. Correctional Services of Canada, 2022 CHRT 12 at para 14).

[11] In addition to the lack of a sufficient nexus with the original complaint, the principle of proportionality may warrant imposing limits based on the circumstances of each case (Temate v. Public Health Agency of Canada, 2022 CHRT 31 at para 58). While the Tribunal has the power to strike portions of a party’s SOP on a preliminary basis, it must exercise this authority cautiously and only in the “clearest of cases” (Richards v. Correctional Service Canada, 2020 CHRT 27 at para 86).

A. How to determine the substance of the complaint?

[12] To determine whether the disputed allegations are within the scope of the complaint, I must first determine the substance of the complaint that Mr. Richards filed and that the Commission referred to the Tribunal.

[13] Mr. Richards’ allegations begin in September 2021 and are ongoing. He checked off race and religion, but he writes that he is making his complaint under section 14.1 of the Act which deals with allegations of retaliation. His complaint sets out allegations about two CSC institutions where he resided, namely Cowansville and Warkworth:

Cowansville allegations (September 2021–January 2022)

• ·Tampering with diet and access to kitchen

• ·Issues surrounding privileged mail, health care and harassment (i.e., shining flashlight in eyes)

• ·Being in 23.5-hour lockdown between January 4 and 27, 2022

Warkworth allegations (February 2022–October 2022)

• ·Transfer to Warkworth

• ·Being kept in quarantine in Warkworth

• ·Having his diet cancelled and medical mattress removed

• ·Cancellation of interview regarding Black Inmate experience

• ·Staff rushing his cell looking for alcohol

• ·Being called first for canteen and then sent back

• ·Indigenous/Muslim inmate claiming his Quran was thrown

• ·Having Rasta group elder interfere so that Muslim inmates could not use the chapel for Eid prayer

• ·Attempted suicide while on 23-hour lockdown (old segregation unit) for 12 days after testing positive for COVID

[14] When the Commission referred the complaint to the Tribunal, it attached its Record of Decision which summarized the complaint as follows:

He alleges that, between September and December 2021, there was tampering with his diet and access to the kitchen, issues surrounding privileged mail, healthcare and harassment. He also states being on lockdown due to covid for 23.5 hours in January 2022 and again in February 2022. He was transferred to another institution where his diet was cancelled and his medical mattress removed. In May 2022, he was denied an Eid prayer because the chaplain stated that covid restrictions prevented group gatherings.

[15] The Commission argues that Mr. Richards’ complaint includes broad categories of retaliation allegations, such as issues with health care and harassment, and that the timeframe is only approximate and includes a series of events that impacted the Complainant’s well-being. But a complaint is not a net that can be cast ever wider to encompass an expanding series of allegations that have no grounding in the factual matrix of the complaint.

[16] The Tribunal can be flexible in assessing the four corners of a complaint given the remedial nature of the Act and its task to examine the real issues between the parties. This does not mean permitting an elasticity in the scope of a complaint that stretches the bounds of that complaint further and further, adding new allegations that a respondent has to defend, all purportedly in the name of refinement, clarification or context. Doing so is not only unfair to the respondent in a particular case, but it also undermines the legislative framework by allowing a party to sidestep the Commission process and to add what is substantially a new complaint at the SOP phase. It is also at odds with the Act’s requirement to proceed expeditiously and fairly. Allowing unrelated allegations that cannot be tied back to the complaint unduly lengthens the hearing process and dilutes the heart of the dispute. This impacts not only the parties to this case, but all others waiting for their complaints to be heard and adjudicated by this Tribunal. Tribunal proceedings are not roving commissions of inquiry into amorphous complaints or moving targets.

[17] The Commission has the prerogative to refer complaints to the Tribunal at any stage after the filing of a complaint under section 49(1) of the Act if it believes an inquiry is warranted. The Commission referred this complaint under its simplified process. The Commission submits that, as it elected not to investigate in this case, facts that could have come to light during the investigation did not arise until the particulars were filed. Whether or not the Commission chose to investigate is immaterial to my determination of the scope of the complaint. It is not for the Tribunal to step into the shoes of the Commission, and the Tribunal’s mandate is to inquire into the complaint that was referred to the Tribunal. It is not because the Commission chose to proceed without an investigation that proceedings will be permitted to burgeon at the Tribunal stage without a sufficient nexus to the complaint filed.

[18] I also reject the Commission’s claim that the length of its complaint form is a factor in determining the scope of the complaint. The Commission relies on the Tribunal’s ruling in Liu v Public Safety Canada, 2024 CHRT 104 at para 30 [Liu] in arguing that its three-page form is insufficient for addressing the complexities of a case. In Liu, there were two versions of the complaint: first, the original one that the complainant filed and which exceeded the three-page limit and second, a pared-down referral that respected the three-page limit. The Tribunal found that the complainant always intended for the allegations at issue to form part of the inquiry - despite the fact that they were not mentioned in the referral complaint - because they had been referenced in the longer original complaint. The Tribunal also referenced the complexity of a case involving multiple represented organizations that involves numerous factual and legal issues and said that substance should prevail over form.

[19] Those circumstances are entirely distinguishable from Mr. Richards’ complaint, which involves one complainant who set out quite specific and contained claims of alleged retaliatory acts taken by CSC in his complaint.

[20] While the Commission suggests that procedural formalities should not obstruct the Tribunal’s ability to address the substantive issues at hand, allowing complaints to change and morph into areas that go beyond the heart of the dispute impacts the fairness and efficiency of the proceedings. It is the Tribunal’s task to respect the legislative framework that governs federal human rights proceedings. If the allegations in the SOP do not merely clarify, refine or elaborate on the complaint and instead seek to introduce new ones, then they are out of scope, regardless of the length of the complaint form. The allegations that are out of scope in Mr. Richards’ SOP do not constitute “more of the same”, and they refer to new events and new incidents and involve a different constellation of actors.

B. Should some of the allegations in Mr. Richards’ and the Commission’s SOPs be struck because they are outside the scope of the complaint or because it is plain and obvious they will fail?

[21] Yes. Several of the allegations in Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP are outside the scope of the complaint the Commission referred to the Tribunal and are not connected to his initial allegations. In contrast, the allegations that relate to Mr. Richards’ access to the canteen, to prayers and to health services while in quarantine at Cowansville have a sufficient nexus to his complaint and provide additional detail that can assist the Tribunal in its task of determining the core of the issues in dispute between the parties. I am also striking some allegations because I find it is plain and obvious they will fail as a claim of retaliation. I will not hear evidence about the struck allegations, nor are the parties required to disclose materials related to these allegations.

[22] I have compared the complaint form and the Commission’s referral with Mr. Richards’ and the Commission’s SOPs. My findings are set out below in two groups: first, those that are out of scope or are bound to fail; and second, those that are within scope and will not be struck from Mr. Richards’ or the Commission’s SOPs.

(i) Allegations to be struck

[23] The following allegations will be struck from the Amended SOP, and where appropriate, from the Commission’s SOP, as set out below.

(a) Allegations that Mr. Richards was convicted of two institutional charges (para 16a of Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP and para 35 of the Commission’s SOP)

[24] In his Amended SOP, Mr. Richards alleges that he was convicted of two institutional charges, that the officers who filed the charges were different from the officers who testified at trial in May 2021, and that other charges were strategically withdrawn at the request of a correctional manager.

[25] These allegations about institutional charges are unrelated to what Mr. Richards alleged in his complaint.

[26] The Commission argues that the allegations are integral to understanding the broader pattern of behaviour by CSC and its impact on Mr. Richards. It further submits that striking these allegations from its SOP would hinder the Tribunal’s ability to fully assess the context of Mr. Richards’ complaint and would detract from the broader public interest in addressing alleged retaliatory practice within CSC.

[27] I reject these arguments. A Tribunal complaint process is not an ever-expanding generalized inquiry into allegations of retaliatory practices within CSC, nor are allegations with no linkage back to the referred complaint necessary to understand the context of the issues in dispute in this complaint, which are quite contained and specific. There is no mention at all of institutional charges in the complaint form. The SOPs add new allegations that are being mentioned for the first time, and they are out of scope.

(b) Allegation involving another inmate (para 20 of Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP)

[28] I agree with CSC that Mr. Richards’ allegation that another inmate was assaulted by staff when they filed a complaint with the Commission was not referenced in the initial complaint and has no factual connection to the complaint the Commission referred. The passage will be struck from Mr. Richards’ SOP:

This was the nurse who turned her back when inmate Hamid Hafizi was being assaulted by staff on the same date that he verbally filed a complaint with the Commission (21/01/08).

[29] Further, even if advanced, this allegation is bound to fail as it is not alleged that Mr. Richards personally experienced an adverse impact in relation to the allegation, which is a requirement to establish retaliation under the Act.

(c) Allegations about the handling of COVID-19 (paragraphs 23 a) to f), j) and 74 of Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP)

[30] In his complaint, Mr. Richards alleged as follows:

Approximately Jan 4, 2022 – Jan 27, 2022 we were on 23.5 hr lockdown in unit 9 due to Covid health services and Cowansville Management said they were following federal restrictions. They also told us that we were being quaranteen for 14 days, and our 14 days restarted whenever a new inmate tested positive for Covid.

We only came off 23.5 hr lockdown on approximately 22/01/27 after blocking our cell doors and windows for days and calling lawyers. During this time frame I provided 4 negative tests and was already triple vaccinated.

[31] In Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP, he alleges that Cowansville handled the management of COVID wrong “globally” and “personally” with him. He makes a number of allegations about the way the institution responded to the pandemic and its internal practices. For example, in subparagraph 23 d) and in paragraph 74, Mr. Richards alleges that staff refused to wear masks or other protective equipment.

[32] CSC argues that Cowansville’s management of the pandemic “globally” cannot constitute retaliation because it involves all inmates at Cowansville and not just Mr. Richards. It argues these paragraphs should be struck because they do not address actions taken against Mr. Richards specifically or that can be linked to the filing of his human rights complaints.

[33] I agree that these allegations are bound to fail and also find that they are out of scope. This human rights proceeding is not a generalized inquiry into whether CSC respected COVID-related protocols or public health guidance. The substance of Mr. Richards’ allegations during the January 2022 period relate to his time in quarantine and allege he was personally denied access to services despite having received negative COVID tests and being vaccinated. While the requested paragraphs are struck, sub-paragraphs h, i and k of paragraph 23 of Mr. Richards SOP will continue in the process.

(d) Allegations towards CSC officers about an institutional charge and about being placed in Unit 9 (paras 59–64 of Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP)

[34] These allegations in Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP relating to Warkworth Institution have no nexus with his complaint. There is no reference to these events in his complaint, and they cannot be linked to an existing allegation. They appear for the first time in the SOP and cannot now be added.

[35] Mr. Richards alleges that an officer was terminated from CSC after events involving another officer and an inmate (paras 59 to 62). He also alleges that his “first inmate offense/charge” at Warkworth Institution was authorized by an officer after he called her to mediate a disagreement between him and another officer (para 63). He further alleges that he was placed in Unit 9 following his release from quarantine, where he was involved in fights with other inmates (para 64).

[36] Mr. Richards’ complaint makes no reference to these events, and they are not part of the same continuum of factual circumstances set out in his complaint.

(e) Allegation of a use-of-force incident involving another inmate (para 71)

[37] Mr. Richards’ allegation that there was a use-of-force incident involving an Indigenous/Muslim inmate was in his complaint form in April 2022. I agree with CSC, however, that it is plain and obvious that it cannot establish a case of retaliation against Mr. Richards. The incident involves another inmate, and Mr. Richards does not allege any adverse impact or even set out how he was involved.

(f) Allegations that Mr. Richards did not receive adequate healthcare services at Warkworth (paras 65–68 of Mr. Richards’ SOP; paras 49–50 of the Commission’s SOP)

[38] In his Amended SOP, Mr. Richards alleges that he received inadequate healthcare services in February and April 2022 at Warkworth. Mr. Richards’ complaint form refers to healthcare services at Cowansville only. I agree with CSC that the allegations in the Amended SOP refer to a different institution and different actors and events. For example, Mr. Richards makes allegations about the conduct of nurses he saw for a health issue in February 2022 that made him uncomfortable. He also makes allegations about a physician who was not sanitary and who he says did not properly examine his feet.

[39] Using the words “health care” is not sufficient to link the substance of the complaint to a whole new set of allegations about the provision of health care services in another CSC institution, at a different time, involving completely different actors. These new allegations have no connection to the allegations in his complaint, which were about health services at Cowansville. These allegations will be struck, as will paragraphs 49 and 50 of the Commission’s SOP.

(ii) Allegations that are not struck

[40] I am dismissing CSC’s request to strike the following allegations and paragraphs from Mr. Richards’ and the Commission’s SOPs. They are either within the scope of the complaint, or I am not persuaded that it is plain and obvious that they will fail.

(a) Allegation that Mr. Richards and his peers were the last ones to receive canteen and were denied their right to prayer because of COVID-19 restrictions (paras 70 and 72 of Mr. Richards’ SOP and paras 52–53 of the Commission’s SOP)

[41] Mr. Richards alleges that, in April 2022, “[he] and [his] peers (Muslims) were told that they would be called first to canteen because we were fasting”. They were called first but sent back to their unit. Mr. Richards alleges that he was the second last inmate in his unit to receive canteen. Mr. Richards also alleges that, in May 2022, he and the other Muslim inmates were denied their right to prayer because of COVID-19 restrictions when they went to the Chapel for Eid prayer.

[42] CSC argues these allegations are bound to fail as it is plain and obvious that they cannot succeed in establishing a case of retaliation against Mr. Richards. The allegations involve multiple inmates, and Mr. Richards does not explain how his human rights complaint could reasonably have been a factor in the adverse treatment alleged.

[43] CSC’s request to strike these allegations and corresponding paragraphs from the Commission’s SOP is dismissed. Mr. Richards has the onus of establishing how his human rights complaint could reasonably have been a factor in the adverse treatment involving him, along with other inmates. CSC can respond to the allegations in its SOP and will lead responding evidence as it sees fit, but it is not plain and obvious to me that the allegations will fail.

(b) Allegations that Mr. Richards received inadequate medical services while sick with COVID (paras 75–76 and para 55 of the Commission’s SOP)

[44] In his complaint form, Mr. Richards writes that, on October 10, 2022, he attempted suicide while on 23-hour lockdown for 12 days (old segregation unit) after testing positive for COVID and feeling like life was not worth living anymore.

[45] CSC wants the Tribunal to strike paragraphs 75 and 76 of Mr. Richards’ SOP that state as follows:

75. During my COVID quaranteen I was very sick, could not breath and lost a lot of weight. I was not given anything to combat COVID nor the fever. I was not given citrus, healthier meals, fruits nor any medication They just left me in the cell to suffer under 23 hr lockdown.

76. The Chief of Mental Health Dr. Geris Serran told me that she made arrangements for me to be let out of my cell (timeframe) similar to the SIU. However Jen McArthy and her colleagues did not comply. They said it was up to the Warden and he did not authorise it.

[46] In my view, the paragraphs that CSC takes issue with squarely fall within how Mr. Richards was treated in the 23-hour period mentioned in his complaint form, and I find that they are within scope and that they have a sufficient nexus to his complaint. I agree with the Commission that Mr. Richards provides additional context related to this allegation in his particulars, further elaborating on the incident. For similar reasons, the paragraph in the Commission’s SOP is within scope and will not be struck.

C. Should portions of Mr. Richards’ witness statements be struck?

[47] CSC argues that the witness list and will-say statements that Mr. Richards submitted include incomplete allegations containing insufficient details. In addition to its request to strike allegations from Mr. Richards’ SOP, it wants the Tribunal to strike parts of witness statements that go beyond the complaint.

[48] To the extent that the will-say statements outline intended evidence that relates to incidents that are outside the scope of this complaint, CSC may address this at the hearing. The parties will have to revisit their witness list and will-say statements as the hearing approaches and should refine them accordingly. But it is not an efficient use of the Tribunal’s or the parties’ time to start striking sentences or portions of will-say statements in such a granular way at this stage, and it is premature in any event. I have ruled on the allegations that are out of scope and that should be struck, and it is up to Mr. Richards, the Commission and CSC to focus their cases accordingly and to only call evidence relevant to the issues in dispute. In any event, I am not going to spend valuable hearing time hearing irrelevant evidence about events that are not even before this Tribunal.

[49] If there are concerns about the sufficiency of the will-say statements, I will address this with the parties when hearing dates are set.

D. Are further particulars required for CSC to be able to fairly prepare for the hearing and for the efficient conduct of these proceedings?

[50] Yes. Although Mr. Richards provided further particulars in his response to CSC’s motion, which CSC accepts, Mr. Richards must set out the remedies he is seeking in the event he is successful in establishing retaliation under the Act.

[51] CSC made requests for further particulars in relation to a number of paragraphs set out in Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP that relate to his claims about breaches to his privileged mail, to his transfer and disbursement forms and requests, to interactions with a correctional officer during his time in quarantine, and to a search for alcohol in his cell that allegedly took place in April 2022.

[52] In his response to CSC’s motion, Mr. Richards added particulars, which CSC accepts in its reply submissions as a response to the particulars it requested in its motion, provided that Mr. Richards’ response forms part of the Tribunal’s record.

[53] As CSC accepts Mr. Richards’ particulars as set out in his reply, there is nothing further for the Tribunal to determine with respect to that part of CSC’s motion set out in paragraph 3 related to a number of Mr. Richards’ allegations of discrimination and reprisal.

(i) Particulars on remedial requests

[54] I agree with CSC and the Commission that Mr. Richards must clearly set out the relief he is seeking in the event of a liability finding in his favour.

[55] Rule 18(1)(d) of the Tribunal’s Rules require a complainant to set out any order they are seeking under subsections 53(2) of the Act.

[56] In his SOP, Mr. Richards does set out a number of changes he wants CSC to be ordered to make regarding its policies and procedures, and he also seeks a written apology and an independent Parole Board of Canada assessment, as well as independent culturally sensitive trauma counselling.

[57] While Mr. Richards includes a request for compensation, he does not set out what that would entail and writes that he is seeking “full compensation from CSC for its infliction of trauma and mental infliction…”.

[58] Mr. Richards must set out the specific order he is asking the Tribunal to make under section 53(2) of the Act, including the damages he seeks, if any, and the amounts he is asking the Tribunal to order if he is successful in establishing liability under the Act.

(ii) Resubmitting amended SOPs

[59] Mr. Richards is self-represented and is incarcerated. I am not going to require him to resubmit a second amended SOP to include the material facts he added in his response to CSC’s motion or with a strike-out of the paragraphs I have ordered struck. His response entitled “Complainant’s response to the Respondent’s Motion for Particulars” dated December 7, 2024, and received on December 17, 2024, is part of the record and should be read together with his Amended SOP as his full set of particulars that outline the extent of his allegations of discrimination and reprisal against CSC.

E. Should the Tribunal extend the timelines for the filing of CSC’s SOP, disclosure and witness lists and will-say statements?

[60] No. The Tribunal has struck many of the paragraphs in Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP that CSC argued were outside the scope of the complaint. Therefore, CSC does not have surprises to respond to, and need not pull together a response to new allegations or seek instruction on a whole new set of factual circumstances. CSC has been on notice about the nature of the allegations set out in the SOP since Mr. Richards filed his complaint, and I see no reason to vary the timelines normally provided for in complaints before the Tribunal.

[61] Further, CSC has already acknowledged that Mr. Richards provided additional particulars in his response to its motion, and he is only ordered to set out his remedial requests in further details. This does not warrant an extension.

V. ORDER

[62] Paragraphs 16a (beginning at “On Sept 17 2021” and ending at “requesting (CCTV) footage that proved wrongdoing by CM Monnette and CX2 Delorne”); 20; 23 a-f, j; 59-68, 71 and 74 are struck from the Complainants’ Amended SOP dated September 27, 2024. The Tribunal will not hear evidence on these allegations, and they will not proceed in the Tribunal’s process.

[63] Paragraphs 35, 49–50 are struck from the Commission’s SOP. The Tribunal will not hear evidence on these allegations, and they will not proceed in the Tribunal’s process. The Commission must submit a revised SOP within seven calendar days of this ruling.

[64] CSC’s request to strike paragraphs 70, 72, 75–76 from Mr. Richards’ Amended SOP is dismissed.

[65] CSC’s request to strike paragraphs 52–53 and paragraph 55 from the Commission’s SOP is dismissed.

[66] CSC’s request to strike parts of Mr. Richards’ witness list and will-say statements is dismissed.

[67] Within 15 days of his receipt of this ruling, Mr. Richards must detail the compensation he is seeking as a remedy for the alleged retaliation.

[68] CSC’s request for 45 days to submit its SOP is denied. Its SOP is due three weeks from the date it receives Mr. Richards’ particulars on his compensation, per the normal timeframe.

Signed by

Jennifer Khurana

Tribunal Member

Ottawa, Ontario

January 27, 2025

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal

Parties of Record

File No. : HR-DP-3025-24

Style of Cause: Ryan Richards v. Correctional Service Canada

Ruling of the Tribunal Dated: January 27, 2025

Motion dealt with in writing without appearance of parties

Written representations by:

Ryan Richards , Self-represented

Ikram Warsame , for the Canadian Human Rights Commission

Susanne Wladysiuk , for the Respondent